国际化的人民币能成为下一个美元吗？

The Choice Facing China as Its Currency Becomes More Global
国际化的人民币能成为下一个美元吗？

There is surely some clinking of Champagne glasses, or perhaps a Chinese celebratory equivalent, taking place in the hallways of China’s finance ministry and central bank. Those officials will now be the proud guardians of a “global reserve currency,” after a long-sought decision Monday by the International Monetary Fund.

在中国的财政部和央行，肯定有人举着香槟碰杯庆祝，也或许是与此相当的中式庆祝。国际货币基金（International Monetary Fund，简称IMF）组织周一做出那些官员梦寐以求的决定后，他们现在就是骄傲的“全球储备货币”守护人了。

But they will soon find that the step raises more questions than it answers about China’s role among nations and that the hardest decisions lie ahead. Being a world financial hegemon comes with meaningful costs, in addition to benefits.

但他们很快便会发现，此举在中国的国际角色上带来的问题比它回答的问题还多，将来他们需要面对最艰难的抉择。作为一名世界金融领导者除了可以得到益处外，也会付出相当的代价。

The direct implications of the I.M.F. decision are narrow. The renminbi (also known as the yuan) will join the dollar, euro, yen and pound in an elite group of currencies. But if you’re not a reserve manager for some national treasury, seeking to build emergency savings to buffer the vicissitudes of global finance, the direct impact of China’s inclusion in “special drawing rights” is limited.

IMF的决定的直接含义比较简单。就是指人民币将和美元、欧元、日元和英镑一起，成为货币精英团体中的一员。如果你不是某国财政部的储备管理人，力图建立应急储蓄以抵御全球金融变迁，那么将中国的货币纳入“特别提款权”的直接影响有限。

The big question for the future is whether this is akin to what happened about a century ago, when the United States dollar was gradually supplanting the British pound as the predominant currency for global trade and finance. This development was a crucial piece of the nation’s rise to superpower status. Conversely, China’s leaders in the years ahead could decide that being a world financial hegemon carries too many costs, in which case the renminbi will be more like the British pound or Japanese yen ― important currencies, certainly, but not so important as to create continuing political and economic burdens on their nations.

关乎未来的大问题是，此事是否和大约一个世纪前发生的事情类似。当时，美元逐渐取代英镑，成为全球贸易和金融的主要货币。这一进展是美国崛起为超级大国的关键组成部分。反过来，中国领导人在未来几年可能会认为，成为世界头号金融大国的代价太高，届时人民币会更像英镑或日元，肯定是重要的货币，但不会重要到给本国造成持续的政治和经济负担。

The decision for China is whether it is content to have a global reserve currency, or if it aspires for the renminbi to one day be as important to trade and finance as the dollar is now. These are both benefits and costs in being the leading global reserve currency: the default currency for world trade and financial transactions, the most widely used unit for savings, and so on. Understanding these pluses and minuses is essential to understanding the tensions China faces as it decides how far it wishes to go down the road of financial liberalization and leadership in the world economy.

中国要决定是满足于自己的货币是全球储备货币，还是渴望人民币对贸易和金融的重要程度，能在有一天达到现在美元的水平。世界贸易和金融交易的默认货币，使用最广泛的储蓄单位等，这些既是作为主导性全球储备货币的好处，也是要付出的代价。要理解中国面临的抉择，即打算沿着金融自由化和世界经济领导者的道路走多远，必须首先理解这些利弊。

Remember when the global financial system nearly melted down in 2008 because of problems centered in the United States housing market and banking system? That’s the kind of crisis that in most countries would prompt a currency crisis and sharp outflow of capital, making a dire situation worse.

还记得2008年时，全球金融体系几乎因为以美国房地产市场和银行体系为中心的问题而崩溃吗？在大部分国家，这种危机都可能引发货币危机，加剧资本外流，导致岌岌可危的形势进一步恶化。

In that miserable fall of 2008, though, the dollar actually soared. Treasury bonds were in such hot demand that U.S. interest rates plummeted. The United States’ role as the bedrock of the global financial system was a crucial reason a terrible situation didn’t become worse; when things went bad, the United States ― and especially its government debt ― were a beacon of safety.

但在2008年那个凄惨的秋天，美元实际上是升值的。美国国债如此抢手，以至利率暴跌。美国作为全球金融体系的基石这个角色，是危险局势没有恶化的关键原因。情况恶化时，美国，特别是其政府债务，是象征着安全的灯塔。

Even in times of noncrisis, the country that is the leading global reserve currency will tend to have a stronger currency and lower interest rates than it would otherwise, thanks to continuing purchases of its assets by individuals, companies and other nations.

即便是在没有危机的时期，和货币不是主导性全球储备货币的国家相比，主导性全球储备货币往往更坚挺，所在国家的利率也往往更低，因为个人、公司和其他国家会持续购买其资产。

Then there’s geopolitics. Ownership of the premier global reserve currency gives a country sway in global politics and security that are hard to obtain any other way. In the last few years, the United States has enforced economic sanctions on countries including Russia, Iran and North Korea, and waged outright financial war against what it considered to be terrorist groups.

此外还有地缘政治。货币是头等重要的全球储备货币，会赋予一个国家在全球政治和安全中的影响力，这种影响力很难通过其他任何方式获得。过去几年里，美国对俄罗斯、伊朗和朝鲜等国实行经济制裁，并直接对它认为的恐怖组织发起了金融战。

In effect, any bank that facilitates the transfer of money in violation of those sanctions risks being cut off from global transfer of dollars ― which in turn means being cut off from much of the global economy. Analysts at Eurasia Group have called this the “weaponization of finance,” and it is one of the important ways that financial supremacy and geopolitical supremacy go hand in hand for the United States.

实际上，为违反这些制裁的资金转移提供便利的任何银行，都可能会被禁止在全球进行美元交易，这反过来意味着阻断了其与全球经济中很大一部分的联系。欧亚集团(Eurasia Group)的分析师称其为“金融武器化”。这是美国同时利用金融霸权和地缘政治霸权的重要方式之一。

Surely China might like to have a similar scale of influence on global affairs, but to do so it would need the renminbi to be as fundamental to finance as the dollar. Which raises the reasons not to do that.

当然，中国可能想在全球事务中拥有类似的影响力，但要做到这一点，中国需要让人民币对金融的重要性达到美元的程度。这就引出了不那么做的理由。

It may be a cliché to observe that with great power comes great responsibility, but here it applies. The United States enjoys what’s been called an “exorbitant privilege” from the dollar’s central role in global finance, but researchers have also taken to calling it an “exorbitant duty.”

权力越大责任越大这句话已经被用滥，但道理的确适用。美元在全球金融中的核心角色为美国带来了所谓的“过度特权”，但研究人员也常称其为“过度责任”。

Essentially, the price the United States pays for that role is having fewer tools to manage its domestic economy.

从本质上来说，美国为这一角色付出的代价是管理国内经济的手段减少。

China has long restricted the ability of businesses and individuals to transfer funds in and out of the country, helping it prevent huge economic swings as investors’ interest in investing in China waxes and wanes. It has made exports central to its economic development strategy, using market interventions and those capital controls to keep its currency undervalued relative to fundamentals, at least until recently.

中国长期限制企业和个人将资金转进和转出中国的能力，当投资者对在中国投资的兴趣发生变化时，这种限制有助于避免出现剧烈摇摆。中国使出口成为其经济发展战略的核心，用市场干预和那些资本控制手段保持人民币相对于基本面来说被低估，至少不久前是这样。

Contrast that with the United States. Pretty much anyone, anywhere can buy a United States Treasury bond, for any reason. The dollar rises or falls based on market forces, and on net is probably stronger than it otherwise would be because of the reserve currency role. That leaves American exporters at a perpetual disadvantage.

这和美国形成了对比。几乎任何人在任何地方都能以任何理由购买美国国债。美元基于市场力量升值或贬值，而且真正的事实是，如果不是储备货币，它可能没现在这么强势。这导致美国的出口永远处于劣势。

Chinese officials seemed caught by surprise this summer when decisions to liberalize trading in their currency and prop up their domestic stock market caused widespread ripples through global markets. This is one of the more subtle costs of becoming a major player on the global financial scene: Your actions don’t affect just you.

今年夏季，推动人民币兑换自由化、支持国内股市的决定在全球市场引发了广泛的涟漪效应，中国官员似乎对此颇为意外。在国际金融领域扮演重要角色要付出一些比较微妙的代价，其中之一就是：你的举措不只影响你自己。

Part of the reason the United States dollar is so important is that the United States has legal, political and monetary institutions that make international investors and business people feel confident they can always get easy access to money traded in dollars. The United States government has control in some areas (economic sanctions for geopolitical foes, for example) because it gives up control in many others (exchange rate, capital flows, legal protections for foreign investors).

美元如此重要的部分原因在于，美国拥有的法律、政治与货币体系能让国际投资者及商界人士确信，他们总是能够轻松获得以美元计价的货币。美国政府之所以在某些领域（例如，对地缘政治上的敌人施加经济制裁）拥有控制权，是因为它放弃了其他很多领域（汇率、资本流动、针对外国投资者的法律保护）的控制权。

The question for China’s political leaders is whether that trade-off is worth it.

对于中国的政治领导人来说，问题在于这种交换是否值得。

“The renminbi will not be seen as a safe haven currency unless economic reforms are accompanied by broader legal, political and institutional reforms that are necessary to inspire the trust of foreign investors,” said Eswar Prasad, an economist at Cornell and author of “The Dollar Trap,” in an email. “China’s government has made it abundantly clear that such reforms are not on the cards.”

“人民币不会被视作避险货币，除非中国在实施经济改革的同时，推行获得外国投资者信任所必需的广泛的法律、政治及机构改革，”康奈尔大学(Cornell University)经济学教授埃斯瓦尔・普拉萨德(Eswar Prasad)在邮件中表示。“中国政府一直非常明确地表明，不可能实施此类改革。”普拉萨德著有《美元陷阱》(The Dollar Trap)一书。

Still, financial history moves slowly, and Monday’s action from the I.M.F. is one more baby step toward China’s financial pre-eminence.

不过，金融史发展得十分缓慢，IMF周一的举措推动中国朝着在金融领域获得举足轻重地位的方向又迈出了一小步。